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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1 . Should t h i s Court reverse defendant 's conviction on 
grounds tha t the was denied h i s Sixth Amendment r ight of speedy 
t r i a l ? 
2 . Was defendant 's s ta tu tory r ight to a timely 
preliminary examination viola ted? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
THOMAS OSSANA, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 20779 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas Ossana, was charged with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute 
for Value, a felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(Supp. 1983) . 
Defendant, who waived his right to a jury, was brought 
to trial on April 23, 1985, and was found guilty as charged on 
April 29, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Fishier on June 3, 
1985, to a term not to exceed 15 years in the Utah State Prison, 
and was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $15,000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The i s s u e s r a i s e d on t h i s appeal i n v o l v e only the 
q u e s t i o n of whether defendant was improperly denied h i s r i g h t t o 
a prompt d e t e r m i n a t i o n of probable cause and h i s r i g h t t o a 
speedy t r i a l . The S t a t e b e l i e v e s t h a t s e t t i n g f o r t h a chronology 
of the r e l e v a n t procedural e v e n t s of t h i s case would be h e l p f u l 
i n a d d r e s s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m s . 
Time Table 
15 October 1980 
17 October 1980 
21 October 1980 
30 October 1980 
7 November 1980 
12 November 1980 
12 November 1980 
15 December 1980 
24 February 1982 
£££Ht 
Police informant buys one-eighth 
ounce of cocaine from defendant 
a t h is residence (R. 400-415). 
Pursuant to search warrant, police 
find four pounds of high grade 
cocaine, about one-and-a-half 
pounds of marijuana, other 
drugs, and $27,500 cash at 
defendant 's residence (R. 35-36, 
86) • 
The State charges defendant by 
information with Unlawful 
Possession with In tent to 
Dis t r ibu te for Value (R. 86). 
Defendant moves to discover the 
name of the confidential informant 
to whom he sold cocaine (R. 10)• 
Fifth Circui t Court i ssues order 
compelling the Sta te to disclose 
the confident ial informant 's name 
(R. 42-44). 
The State pe t i t i ons the Third 
D i s t r i c t Court for an extraordinary 
wri t se t t ing aside the c i r c u i t 
c o u r t ' s discovery order (R. 28-32). 
D i s t r i c t Court i ssues order staying 
proceedings in the c i r c u i t court 
and se t s hearing date on S t a t e ' s 
motion for extraordinary wr i t 
(R. 27). 
D i s t r i c t court issues memorandum 
opinion, to be followed by a writ 
of mandamus, declaring the c i r c u i t 
cour t ' s discovery order nul l and 
void (R. 25-26) • 
D i s t r i c t court remands case to 
c i r c u i t court for preliminary 
hearing (R. 24) . 
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1 March 1982 
25 October 1984 
14 January 1985 
6 February 1985 
7 February 1985 
14 February 1985 
1 March 1985 
22 April 1985 
23 April 1985 
29 April 1985 
21 June 1985 
Upon defendant 's motion, d i s t r i c t 
court i ssues second order staying 
proceedings in c i r c u i t court (R. 23). 
(Defendant appeals d i s t r i c t cou r t ' s 
order denying discovery to t h i s 
Court.) 
This Court reverses d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s rul ing granting mandamus 
(Cannon v. Kel le r , 692 P.2d 740 
(Utah 1984)). 
Upon S t a t e ' s motionf preliminary 
hearing i s set for 7 February 1985 
(R. 4 ) . 
This Court remits defendant 's case 
to the c i r c u i t court for further 
proceedings (Cannon v. Keller , 
No, 18441, Exhibit D- l ) . 
Circui t court orders Sta te to 
comply with or iginal discovery 
order by 8 February 1985, or to 
return the property seized from 
defendant (R. 9 ) . 
Preliminary hearing i s held and 
defendant i s bound over for t r i a l 
(R. 6-8) . 
Defendant moves tha t d i s t r i c t court 
dismiss the charges against him for 
lack of prompt determination of 
probable cause and for want of 
speedy t r i a l (R. 103). 
D i s t r i c t court denies defendant 's 
motion to dismiss (R. 95)• 
Defendant is brought to trial 
(R. 96). 
District Court finds defendant 
guilty as charged (R. 98). 
Defendant is granted release on 
bail pending his appeal to this 
Court (R. 202-203). 
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SUMMARY OF ARfttipENTS 
This Court should not reverse defendant 's criminal 
conviction on grounds tha t he was denied h i s r ight to a speedy 
t r i a l , for the following reasons: (1) defendant nei ther objected 
to any continuance nor asser ted his r ight to a speedy t r i a l in 
over 52 monthsf (2) defendant himself aff irmatively caused most 
of the delay in proceedings below, and (3) defendant made no 
persuasive a l l ega t ion t ha t he was prejudiced by the delay. 
Defendant's argument tha t he was denied his r ight to a 
preliminary hearing within the s ta tu tory time period i s without 
meri t , because defendant has made no showing tha t the 
continuances granted were not based upon good cause, and because 
defendant by his ac t ions waived t h i s right* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE 
REVERSED ON GROUNDS THAT HE WAS DENIED 
HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
Defendant claims t ha t h i s conviction should be 
overturned because he was denied his Sixth Amendment r ight to a 
speedy t r i a l . He notes t ha t the leading decision of the United 
S ta tes Supreme Court on t h i s issue i s Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In fcatkaJL, the 
Supreme Court adopted a four-factor balancing t e s t to be applied 
in determining whether a defendant 's r igh t to a speedy t r i a l has 
been v io l a t ed . The fac tors a r e : (1) the length of the delay, 
(2) the reasons jus t i fy ing the delay, (3) the strength of the 
defendant 's e f for t s to a s se r t h is r ight to a speedy t r i a l , and 
- 4 -
(4) the degree of prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. 530-33. 
This Court has applied the same balancing test in deciding speedy 
trial questions under the Federal and Utah constitutions. See 
State v, Lairby. 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984); State V, Knill, 
656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982). An application of the Barker 
test to the present case demonstrates that defendants speedy 
trial argument is without merit. 
A. LENGTH OF DELAY. 
In Barker, the defendant was not brought to trial until 
more than five years after his arrest. The State obtained 11 
continuances, extending over about four years, without objection 
from the defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss when the 
State sought a twelfth continuance. The State was granted four 
additional continuances due to illness of a key witness. When 
the defendant was finally brought to trial he moved to dismiss 
claiming his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been 
violated. The trial court denied this motion and the defendant 
was convicted as charged. BarkerP 407 U.S. at 516-18. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's speedy trial 
claim and upheld his conviction. 
The Supreme Court stated in Barker that the threshold 
question in a speedy trial challenge is whether there has been a 
sufficiently lengthy delay; there must be a delay that is 
presumptively prejudicial before there is a need to balance the 
other factors. The Supreme Court declared that there is no 
precise point at which the delay becomes prejudicial per se. 
Rather, this inquiry must be determined on an ad hoc basis, 
-5-
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c i rcumstances of each c a s e . I d . a t 53 0 - 3 1 . 
In Barker , the Supreme Court found t h a t the delay between a r r e s t 
and t r i a l of "well over f i ve yea r s . . . was too long a p e r i o d , " 
and t h a t the t h r e s h o l d i n q u i r y had been met . I d . a t 533-34. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s conv ic t i on was upheld because 
coun te rba lanc ing f a c t o r s outweighed t h i s d e f i c i e n c y . I d . a t 534. 
S i m i l a r l y , in t h e p re sen t c a s e , even assuming t h a t t he 
de lay was presumpt ive ly p r e j u d i c i a l , a ba lanc ing of the o ther 
f a c t o r s s e t out in Barker e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t defendant was not 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Indeed, 
on t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a se , d e f e n d a n t ' s speedy t r i a l c la im has 
even l e s s m e r i t than the unsuccessfu l c h a l l e n g e in Barke r . 
B. REASON FOR DELAY. 
Defendant s t a t e s t h a t " in the i n s t a n t c a s e , 51 months 
were consumed whi le the p r o s e c u t i o n s tayed t h e c r imina l 
p rosecu t ion and l i t i g a t e d , in a c o l l a t e r a l a c t i o n , t he v a l i d i t y 
of the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s d i scovery o r d e r . " (Brief of a p p e l l a n t a t 
1 3 , emphasis added.) Defendant m i s r e p r e s e n t s what occurred in 
the proceedings below. Because t h e r e were a number of de l ays 
occasioned by s e p a r a t e causes , i t i s useful t o examine these 
p e r i o d s i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
Per iod One (12 November 1980 - 15 December 1980) . 
On 12 November 1980 (about t h r e e weeks a f t e r defendant was 
charged by i n f o r m a t i o n ) , t h e S t a t e p e t i t i o n e d t h e Third D i s t r i c t 
Court t o s e t a s i d e the c i r c u i t cour t order t h a t the S t a t e 
d i s c l o s e t h e name of a c o n f i d e n t i a l informant , and t h e d i s t r i c t 
cour t ordered the proceedings of the c i r c u i t cour t s tayed (R. 27, 
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28-32, 8 6 ) . On 15 December 1980 , l e s s than f ive weeks l a t e r , ti ;ie 
d i s t r i c t court dec la red the c i r c u i t c o u r t f s d iscovery order void 
(R. 2 5-26) . 
The S t a t e assumes f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : • „ b r i e f 
d e l "i\ A.1 t I n"i.ji 1 lhii !•" I'I i! 1 " i ( i]nut». ]';, i e i c> y 
i s sue a g a i n s t the S t a t e , in Cannon v . K e l l e r , 6 92 P.2d -(J (Utah 
1984) i the S t a t e be] ieves t h a t the mat te r was r a i sed In goud 
f" a i t h , £ i :t d 11: i i , t :i t w as p r o pe r f :: r t h e S t a t e t o se e k 11 J d i c i 111 
r e d r e s s and/or c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the i s s u e , (For a d i s c u s s i o n of 
the government ' s r i ght to de] ay cr iminal p r o c e e d i n g iri order to 
s e e k a pp r o p r i a t e i i 11 e r ] o c i I t o r } r e ] :i e f ,-• ae £ I Q f t i 3r i e f a t 
1 0 . ) 
E e ill od TMJCL ( 1 5 December 19M n_ 2.4 ££]aiiiai^ 13321 
0 n 2 4 Fe br u a r y 19 82., m or e th a i I ] 4 mo n th s af t e r the d :I s t r i c A t 
ru led t h a t t he S t a t e need not comply with the c i r c u i t court* 
d i s c ov e r y or d e r, i :i j : K: • n m o t i o i: I ib;; • t h e S t a t € • 11: : e 3 i s t r i c t c o I I r I: 
remanded defendant ' s case to the c i r cu i t coin: t for p re l imina ry 
hear ing (R, 24) The record i s s i 3 ent as t o the reason for t h i s 
1111 u s ii a 11 d e ] a y T1: i e r e i s :i: i : b a s :i s :i i I t 1 i e r e c o r d f o r s pe c u 1 a t :i c • i i 
by defendant • :::»r the S t a t e 11: :iat t he other i s to b 1 am,e £ or t h i s 
d e l a y . 
Period Three-LLJliiL^li. 13AU r b ^biudiy^Hb^L. 
Although he does not acknowledge t h i s in h i s b r i e f , on 
J March 1982,. defendant obta ined an order from the d i s t r i c t cour t 
stay if lg c i rc • - for a secon 3) . 
Oi I 2:5 O c t o b e . • * f i l e d i t s d e c i s i s - . • i s sue 
r a i s e d uy defendant: b u^yx --.'.ii.Qii.^ I t i l C - / o^z r . z u 7 40)
 f 
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and on 6 February 1985, the case was remitted to the c i r c u i t 
court (Cannon v. Keller , No* 18441, Exhibit D- l ) . Defendant 
spent over 35 months appealing the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order denying 
discovery. Defendant, and not the S ta t e , should be held respon-
s i b l e for the delay of nearly three years caused by his own 
motion to stay proceedings, and by his subsequent appeal .1 (For 
a discussion of the ru le tha t delays occasioned by the defendant 
are excluded time for speedy t r i a l purposes, .&££ infra t h i s Brief 
a t 11.) 
Period Four (6 February 1985 - 29 April 1985) . A final 
in te rva l of l e s s than three months represents the time between 
t h i s Court fs remit t ing defendant 's case to the c i r c u i t court and 
his ul t imate convict ion. Defendant does not al lege any improper 
delay during th is period. 
1
 Defendant a t t r i b u t e s one delay in h is appeal to the fact t ha t 
the county at torney was seven months l a t e in f i l i n g his brief to 
t h i s Court. While the Sta te was in fact found in defaul t for 
f a i lu re to submit i t s br ief , the record ind ica tes tha t t h i s Court 
granted the S ta te a two-month extension of the f i l i n g deadl ine, 
beyond the default (Cannon v. Keller f No. 18441, Exhibit D - l ) . 
The log ica l inference from t h i s Cour t ' s granting the two-month 
extension i s tha t the defaul t was not the r e s u l t of misconduct or 
lack of di l igence by the S t a t e , and may ac tua l ly have been 
occasioned by improper f i l i n g or other faul t of defendant. 
Indeed, defendant protracted h i s appeal by obtaining a number of 
extensions and appears to have f i l ed his own brief t a r d i l y , gee 
id -
Defendant a lso upbraids the S ta te for f a i l i ng to comply with 
the c i r c u i t cou r t ' s discovery order "months" after t h i s Court 
upheld i t s v a l i d i t y . There appears to be l i t t l e merit to t h i s 
argument. The record suggests tha t by 8 February 19 85, two days 
af ter defendant 's case was remitted to the c i r c u i t court , the 
State gave defendant the requested discovery information (R. 6-
9) . While i t i s true tha t the Sta te might have exercised 
extraordinary di l igence by complying with the discovery order 
before the case had even been remanded to the c i r c u i t court , the 
S t a t e ' s ac t ions seem reasonable under the circumstances. In any 
event, defendant concedes tha t any "addit ional delay was short , 
one week" (Brief of Appellant a t 17). 
- 8 -
Thus f the reasons for the 54- month delay in br ing ing 
defendant t o t r i a l can be summarized as fo l lows : (1) de f endan t ' s 
s t a y ^f proceedings and appeal ^ H. i s Court caused a : -month 
delay '4-month l a p s e :• unexplained by the record ; (3) the 
- .
 i
 i i in HI i si i" ill cuiiJ i I I'd use-'i.l a 
c c *«rt\ d e l a y ; and (4) th* remaining per iod of about t h r e e 
months was due to i lormal p rocedure . 
Whei i tl n Barker I 
app l i ed t o t he p resen t ca se r becomes apparent t h a t the "reason 
for delay" f ac to r weighs a g a i n s t defendantVs claim t h a t he was 
improper. I.y denied a speed} t:r ia ] Ii I tl le f i r s t place,- L .,.. '. • 
United S t a t e s Supreme Court and thi s Court have held t h a t , wh<i>'. 
th e r e a r e v a 1 :i d r ea so n s, de 3 ay s by th e g ov e r nme nt i n lbr i n g i ng th e 
defendant to tri al may be appropriate. Ii I Barkerr the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Closely related to length ot aeiay is 
the reason the government assigns to justify 
the delay. Heref too, different weights should 
be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate 
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper 
the defense should be weighed heavily against 
the government. A more neutral reason such as 
negligence or overcrowded courts should be 
weighed less heavily but nevertheless should 
be considered since the ultimate responsibility 
for such circumstances must rest with the govern-
ment rather than with the defendant. Finally, 
a valid reason, such as a missing witnessf 
should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
(Footnote omitted emphasis added.) 
407 u.s, See also United states v. Swell, 1J !.>:. - 6 / 
- L e t i v 
t :a c o n s i s t e d *:*• a p p r o p r i a t e delay) :-* S t a t e v. 
,.. ;.. .^ *. " oil r . z u oil i u t d h ' j i l t of 
speed' * ,S th i F r,oLiir4* o4"Bt°^: 
The purpose of those constitutional 
provisions is to guard against any 
intentional delay which may be oppressive 
or persecutorial in nature. . . . [T]he 
court does not lose jurisdiction • . . 
unless there is some intentional delay 
of an oppressive character, which results 
in prejudice to the defendant[.] 
Xd. at 548-49. In the present case, the State obtained the 
relief it sought within five weeks of the stay of proceedings and 
appears to have acted with reasonable expedition. Defendant's 
naked allegations aside, there is no reason to believe that the 
State1s actions were intentionally oppressive or dilatory. 
Nor is there evidence of a "more neutral reason such as negli-
gence." Although this Court eventually overturned the district 
court's decisionr the fact that the district court, after hearing 
argument of the S te and defendant, decided the discovery 
question in favor of the Statef is persuasive evidence that the 
State had "valid reason" to raise the issue.2 Moreover, the 
courts have consistently held that criminal proceedings may 
properly be delayed while the government reasonably seeks 
interlocutory relief. &££, e.g.f United States v. Herman, 576 
F.2d 1139, 1146 (5th Cir. 1978) ("interlocutory appeal by the 
government is generally a valid reason that justifies appropriate 
delay"); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 890 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (right of the government to appeal before jeopardy attaches 
2
 At some lenth, defendant attacks the State for pursuing 
the extraordinary writ in district court, and prescribes 
alternatives that the State might have pursued. These arguments, 
made in hindsight, appear primarily to be a relitigation of 
Cannon v. Keller and seem to have only slight relevance to the 
speedy trial issue now before this Court. 
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i s designed t o p r o t e c t t he i n t e r e s t of soc ie ty and may ju s t i f y 
attendant delay 
Pi ' " * - -
caused a 35-month dela ;.. wringing his case . t r ie . . : :* . >urt 
has reason to re-*-*1- defendant ~ " > ^.^ c-nxed a 
speedy I i i .1 I "I . . t 
consideration in speed\ trial chal lenges ^s whether t waj the 
State or the defendant > M :r^ - a^v -r «• ; . State v. 
Weddle. 2:9 lit .al 1 - - r u l p appears 
firmly e s tab l i shed that any delay occasioned fay defendant or on 
- - • . - • i t u t e r m i i 0 ng whether h i s 
right * ,:, speedy w., denied, gee State v. Velasquez, 6 43 
; > :! " 1c. , ' * (under forme. I '.ir. s t a t u t e 3 r equ i r i ng 
days, id: l e r e 
defendant himself has requested a continuance,- the d i s p o s i t i o n 
period shal l "be extended fay the amount of time during which 
123 A r i z , 24, 5,97 P.2d 177, 179 (1 979) (any delay occasioned by 
defendant ic excluded time under speedy t r i a l r u l e ) ; S tate v« 
Engl ish , VH 4 (1:1 31 \ 1 t o s p e e d \ 1 1: i a ] 
not violated where delay was "due, in substantia] pai:tr to a 
benefit accruing to appel ] een) . 
The r u 1 e was we] ] stated i 1 1 Cherniwchan v. State , 594 
P. 2d 46 4 (Wyo. 1 9 7 9) 1 
The defendant may be disentitled to 
speedy-trial safeguards where the delay 
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-85-1 (1953) (repealed 1980). 
is all or partly the responsibility of 
the defendant. 
Id. at 468. 
With t h e excep t ion of a five-week de lay in which the 
S t a t e sought e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e l i e f in the d i s t r i c t cou r t f and a 
14-month per iod t h a t t he r eco rd does not adequa te ly e x p l a i n , the 
undue de lay of t h i s case i s p rope r ly a t t r i b u t e d to de fendan t . 
Thus, t he reason for de lay fac to r weighs a g a i n s t r e v e r s i n g 
d e f e n d a n t ' s conv i c t i on on grounds t h a t he was denied h i s r i g h t t o 
a speedy t r i a l . 
C. DEFENDANT'S EFFORT TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT 
In Barker , t he Supreme Court po in ted out t h a t the r i g h t 
to a speedy t r i a l i s d i f f e r e n t from other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , 
in t h a t the d e p r i v a t i o n of t h a t r i g h t may in f a c t work t o the 
d e f e n d a n t ' s advan tage . 407 U.S. a t 5 2 1 . The Supreme Court 
f u r t h e r s t a t e d : 
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactiCt 
As the time between the commission of 
the crime and t r i a l lengthens, witnesses 
may become unavailable or t he i r memories 
may fade. If the witnesses support the 
prosecution, i t s case wi l l be weakened, 
sometimes ser iously so. And i t i s the 
prosecution which ca r r i e s the burden of 
proof. Thus, unlike the r ight to counsel 
or the r igh t to be free from compelled 
se l f - incr imina t ion , deprivat ion of the 
r igh t to speedy t r i a l does not per se 
prejudice the accused 's a b i l i t y to defend 
himself. (Emphasis added.) 
I d . a t 521-22. Consequently, an important factor in deciding 
whether there has been a v io la t ion of the r igh t to a speedy t r i a l 
i s whether the defendant has made e f for t s to a s se r t t h i s r i g h t . 




 - - • . , • .
f
 11 e 
defendant : : ^ sponsibij . a s s u t i, „ t^
 fcj at 
527, 528. The Supreme Court added: 
The strength of his ef for ts wi l l be 
affected by the length of the delay, to 
some extent by the reason for the delay, 
and most pa r t i cu l a r l y by the personal 
prejudice, which i s not always readi ly 
i d e n t i f i a b l e , tha t he experiences. 
The more serious the deprivat ion, the 
more likely a defendant is to complain. 
The d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s speedy 
t r i a l r i g h t , t h e n , i s e n t i t l e d t o a 
s t r o n g e v i d e n t i a r y w e i g h t i n d e t e r m i n i n g 
whe the r t h e d e f e n d a n t i s b e i n g d e p r i v e d 
of t h e r i g h t . We emphas ize t h a t f a i l u r e 
t o a s s e r t t h e r i g h t w i l l make i t d i f f i c u l t 
fo r a d e f e n d a n t t o p r o v e t h a t he was 
d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l . (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
Xd * '" ^ . S i m i l a r l y , t h i s Cour t has s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e 
* - " . s i: i 31: I t t <: a s pe e dy t r:! a ] S t a t e ,vA 
L&lLbyr 699 P .2d 1 1 8 7 , 1191 (Utah 1984: ( " d e f e n d a n t who has no t 
a s s e r t e d h i s or her r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l I n t h e lower c o u r t 
ha s w< i i\ ed t .1 ie :i \ ii :ji :ii .") ; £±a±£. i . 1 1! ill , 6 56 ' P . 2 :l 1 0 26 1 028 (Utah 
1982) (because d e f e n d a n t (among o t h e r t h i n g s ) f a i l e d t o a s s e r t 
hi s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l *e c o n c l u d e t h a t he was no t 
dei IIe• 3 I: 11s r I g 1: 11 t o a speed} t r i a 1) . S t a t e v . Menzies , 
601 P .2d 925 (Utah 1979),- I i i r e j e c t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s speedy t r i a l 
claim,.,- t h i s Cour t found i t s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t 
" o b j e c t ^ t h e t ime . ; * P r o n t r a r v , t hp t r i a l was 
t w i c e d e l a y e d upon h i s r e q u e s t ; j . at ^,> emphas i s a d d e d ) . 
in me
 i * 
c h a r g e d " ^ c 4 - ^ ' ._ , ^a. c, w , - . defenda: . ; >qid 
not in ..- * j ' . - x p r e s s a d e s i i e f^r ^ i ue* 3/ i i i a i . Sir r . : or )t 
1 1 • 
at the time they were granted, but he affirmatively caused most 
of the delay in these proceedings. Only after more than 52 
months, once it appeared that his right to a speedy trial might 
be exploited to obtain a dismissalr did defendant raise the issue 
of speedy trial (R. 103). 
Defendant claims that, even though he did not assert 
his right until March of 1985, he did so as soon as was 
reasonably possible. He would have this Court believe that, from 
the first stay of proceedings in November of 1980f until early in 
1985, he was utterly prohibited from asserting his right to a 
speedy trial, and would otherwise have done so. This argument 
strains credulity. A variety of procedural motions were 
available, including a motion to remove the stay of proceedings, 
whereby defendant could at almost any time have manifest his 
claimed desire for a speedy trial. Moreover, the fact that 
defendant himself stayed the proceedings for the second time, in 
order to pursue his appeal, is inconsistent with his claim that 
the State's efforts made it impossible for him to demand a speedy 
trial. 
Because defendant's own deliberate action was the 
single most significant factor in delaying his trial, this Court 
could properly conclude that defendant waived his right to a 
speedy trial. While the United States Supreme Court has taken 
the position that failure to demand a speedy trial will not by 
itself constitute a waiver of that right, see Barkerf 407 U.S. at 
525, the Court has declared: 
We hardly need add that if delay is 
attributable to the defendant, then his 
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waiver may be given effect under standard 
waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside. 
I d. at 529 This Court has al so recognized that a defendant may 
implicitly or expiicit] y wai ve his ri ght - 3peedy r r1 a' 
through words or conduct. State v. Weddle, 
And addressing UTAH CODE ANN, § "•s 
(repealed 1980) , a former statute requiriny uiai a pusonei be 
brought to ^r?^1 *»*4-fci-« 90 days, this Court stated: 
When tl le prisoner himself acts to delay trial 
on such cha rges , he i n d i c a t e s h i s w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o t empora r i ly waive t h i s p r o t e c t i o n ; t h e 
purpose behind the s t a t u t e thus no longer 
e x i s t s . (Footnote omi t ted . ) 
S t a t e v . Velasquez . 6 4] P.2d a t ] 1 6. See a l s o S t a t e V. Kellyr 
ay sougl it : 1 1 beha] f :: f t I: le defen 3ant 1: ] • 1 11 s 
counsel w i l l , have the e f f ec t of wai ving the d e f e n d a n t ' s 
r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l " ) • 
If tl 11 s Con 1: t: were t o fInd 11 1 a t defendant , cilespite h i s 
conduct , has not waived h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l o u t r i g h t , 
1: y J € ' a s t t e 1: t: it o :i 1 c f 1: i g 1 11 n f a c t • :> 1: s h 01 11 d 
weigh heavi 1 y a g a i n s t hi. the Barker ba lanc ing a n a l y s i s . 
In Barker
 P a key c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the Supreme C o u r t f s r e j e c t i n g 
I In ilH pndimt " i npeejd\ I* 1 ,1 <n I i i 1 1111 w 11 I In I n t I In Ml , I m inn] n 
than t h r e e y e a r s , the defendant made no ob jec t ion t o cont inuances 
sought by the S t a t e . 407 U.S. a t 534. In the p resen t c a se , 
d e f e n d a 1 11 ne / e 1: o b 3 e c t e d I: c • a ny. c o 1 11 i n 1 1 a 1:11 : <t ;. F1 11: t: 1 :t e :i :
 r d e f e n d -
a n t ' s a f f i rma t iv e e f f o 1: t s i n d e 1 ay i n g h I s t r i a ] , n o ne o f w h i c h 
were p re sen t in Barker , make i t d i f f i c u l t i f not imposs ib le ior 
I: i if! tc: • make a l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m t h a t he was 2 mproperly denied a 
speedy t r i a l . 
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D. PREJUDICE 
Defendant cites dicta from the United States Supreme 
Court to the effect the denial of a speedy trial can cause 
prejudice to a defendant, even where the trial defense has not 
been harmed significantlyr and where the defendant has not been 
held in prison. The State agrees that it is proper for this 
Court to consider whether a particular defendant may have 
suffered employment setbacksr disrupted family life or other 
distress as a result of being charged with a crime. It must be 
notedf howeverf that the mere potential for these latter forms of 
prejudice, standing alonef has rarely been found to constitute 
the type of prejudice that would warrant the reversal of a 
criminal conviction. In Barker, for example, the Supreme Court 
recognized that delay might cause the subtler types of prejudice 
referred to by defendant. 407 U.S. at 532. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court found that the "prejudice" factor of the balancing 
test weighed against the defendant's speedy trial claim. 
The court concluded that: 
. . . prejudice was minimal. Of coursef 
Barker was prjudiced to some extent by 
l iv ing under a cloud of suspicion and 
anxiety . Moreover/ although he was 
released on bond for most of the period/ 
he did spend 10 months in j a i l before 
t r i a l . But there i s no claim tha t any 
of Barker ' s witnesses died or otherwise 
became unavailable owing to the delay. 
The t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t ind ica tes only two 
very minor lapses of memory—one on the 
part of a prosecution witness—which 
were in no way s ign i f i can t to the outcome. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id . at 53 4. The Supreme Cour t ' s apparent a t t i t u d e tha t t rue 
prejudice involves more than vague claims of anxiety or 
-16-
d i £ : : ; < : - . • ' - , > • - • • • • . -
works tw tr.c advantage : -* defendant
 w.ii ^ , . a- i . : . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y :• Supreme Cou; Kl iev^ci :. n Barker " t h a t Barker 
d i d iriiif wan I >i F.|H»C dy I i i «J 1 " I d a 
S in i i l a r ly f t i n s Court has r epea t ed ly refused t o r eve r se 
convic t ion ; where the defendant has f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h any 
I lid! i cv di,;i •;• « : . • , i l J I . i S t a t e v Lair by, 6 99 I 2d 
p r e jud i ce where both defendants were granted p r e t r i a l 
r e l e a s e ) ; S t a t e v . K n i l l , 6% P. 2d ,— defendant "makes no 
• - .-> : • • - •• - - ^J^^JLM 
Menzies, 601 P. 2d j e n c c v L v ; e lapsed be for*, t r i a l 
n e i t h e r inconvenienced nor p re jud iced d e f e n d a n t " ) . 
In t he p resen t case r any pre^ud1 '^° to defendant , s 
s p e c u l a t i v e . The ease a g a i n s t defendant was Lt :ona, ind beyond 
t .h e mi 1 d mem or j ] apse s ty pi cal c: if ' - v -
evidence of harm tc • the t r i a l de fense . Defendant does not a l l e g e 
t h a t he was I n c a r c e r a t e d . And defendant does not e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
1" 111\" r o w a s a i i} s i g i i i f i c a i it d i sr u ]|: »t i o i i t : 11 ie e co i: i om:i c, so c i a 1 
other aspects of 1 lis li fe, He provides no basis for his theory 
that a re cent shi f t In pub11c opInIon has caused coc a I ne dea1er s 
t o recei ^ ?re 1 larsl ler sentei ices now I: 1: iai I the^ woi id :1 1 lave foi ir ::)i: 
f i ve y e a r s ago, 
Indee ~ n d i c a t i o n s r" - rf .t > n Barker , tn. 
def end a i it di d ; • . • 
ob jec t t o any • orv \ nuance a s s e i t M: : : ;: 
months i s stror..: evidence t h a t defendant suf fe red no s e r i o u s 
d e p r i v a t i o n and ay va c +r :v dvantage . See Barker , 
I 7 •• 
407 U.S. at 531. Moreover, defendant was willing to spend years 
pursuing the appeal of an issue which he himself claims had "no 
real importance and thus deserve[d] no weight in the balance" 
(Brief of Appellant at 24). This action casts doubt on 
defendant's claim that he desired a speedy trial and was harmed 
by the delay. 
Defendant also obtained advantages by delaying the 
proceedings. He was able to procrastinate the day of his 
conviction, thus securing years of freedom from incarceration, as 
well as the hope that the State's case against him might weaken, 
or that he might obtain a more favorable plea agreement. 
See 407 U.S. at 519 (delay may allow defendants "to negotiate 
more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and 
otherwise manipulate the system"). 
In the present case, as in other cases where this Court 
has refused to reverse convictions on speedy trial grounds, 
defendant makes no persuasive allegation of prejudice. 
He identifies the potential for certain types of prejudice, 
yet makes no showing that he himself suffered such prejudice. 
If there was any prejudice to defendant, it was minimal and was 
probably outweighed by the advantages he sought by delaying his 
trial. Accordingly, the prejudice factor of the Barker balancing 
test should be weighed against defendant. 
E. BALANCING OF FACTORS 
Referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court has 
stated: 
The purpose of those cons t i tu t iona l 
provisions i s to guard against any in ten t iona l 
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delay which may be oppressive or perse cutorial 
in nature. U.S. v. Ewellf 383 U.S. 116, 
86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.627 (1966). 
State v. Archulettar 577 p.2d at 548. s„ee also EarJifij:, 407 u.s. 
579 (speedy trial provisions also protect societal interests, 
such as preventing large backlogs in urban courts and avoiding 
the opportunity for individuals to commit further crimes while 
released on bond). 
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have stressed that the constitutional provisions for speedy trial 
should not be applied where to do so would frustrate rather than 
serve the interests of justice. This Court explained that the 
right to a speedy trial: 
. . . is a right of ancient origin which 
arose because of abuses wherein people 
were kept in custody for unreasonable 
periods of time without trial and even 
without knowing what the charge may be 
against them. It is important as a 
safeguard against any abuse of that 
character. But in the absence thereof, 
it should not be extended as a mere 
abstraction of law in circumstances 
where there is no justification for 
its application. (Emphasis added). 
State v. Weddle, 506 P.2d at 68. See also United States v. 
Ewell. 383 U.S. at 120 (right of speedy trial "does not preclude 
the rights of public justice"). 
In the present case, with the exception of the delays 
caused by defendant himself (and one period unaccounted for by 
the record), the proceedings moved with reasonable expedition. 
For more than 52 months defendant failed to assert his right to 
a speedy trial, and he affirmatively caused most of the delay in 
the proceedings. Defendant does not appear to have wanted a 
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speedy t r i a l , nor does he subs tan t i a te h i s claim tha t he was 
prejudiced by the delay. Under these circumstances f i t would 
not be appropriate for t h i s Court to apply "the unsa t i s f ac to r i ly 
severe remedy of d i smissa l" . See Barker, 407 U.S. a t 522. 
To allow a defendant t o manipulate h is r igh t of speedy t r i a l in 
order to obtain a dismissal f where for years he has sought to 
avoid being t r i e d f would abuse the cons t i tu t iona l r igh t rather 
than effectuate i t s purposes. 
This Court should re jec t defendant 's argument tha t h i s 
conviction should be reversed on grounds tha t he was denied a 
speedy t r i a l . 
POINT I I 
DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO HAVE A 
TIMELY PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION WAS 
NOT VIOLATED. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-7(c) (1982) states in part: 
If the defendant does not waive a preliminary 
examination, the magistrate shall schedule the 
preliminary examination. Such examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but 
in any event not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense 
charged and not later than 30 days if he is 
not in custody; providedf however, that these 
time periods may be extended by the magistrate 
for good cause shown. A preliminary examina-
tion shall not be held if the defendant is 
indicted. 
Thus, the Utah Code establishes the general rule that a defendant 
who is not in custody should receive a preliminary hearing within 
30 days of being charged. The Code expressly recognizes, 
howeverf that exceptions to this 30-day rule may be appropriate. 
Courts are granted discretion to extend this time period for good 
cause shown. 
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In the ins tan t case, defendant 's argument tha t he was 
not granted a timely preliminary examination can be dismissed, 
because § 77-35-7(c) authorized the d i s t r i c t court to postpone 
the preliminary examination where the court found good cause to 
do so. Defendant makes no showing whatever tha t the s tays 
imposed by the d i s t r i c t court were not founded on good cause— 
indeed, the l a t t e r and more lengthy of the two s tays , as noted 
above, was imposed at defendant 's own request . Cer ta inly , 
defendant cannot be heard to complain tha t the continuance 
granted upon his own motion lacked a bas is of good cause. 
Defendant has fa i led to meet h i s burden of proving impropriety in 
the proceedings below. See Sta te v. Jones , 657 .2d 1263, 1267 
(Utah 1982) ("The burden of showing error i s on the party who 
seeks to upset the judgment. In the absence of record evidence 
to the contrary, we assume regu la r i ty in the proceedings below, 
and affirm the judgment.") See also White v. Crouse, 193 Kan. 
674, 396 P.2d 333, 337 (1964) (although the magistrate granted 
three continuances in defendant 's preliminary hearing, "in the 
absence of an affirmative showing the granting thereof was 
unnecessary and unreasonable, t h i s claim [of improper delay] has 
no m e r i t " ) . 
In recent decis ions , t h i s Court has rejected arguments 
tha t the courts below abused the i r d i scre t ion by extending 
preliminary examination time periods. See State v. Bradshaw, 680 
P.2d 1036, 1040-41 (Utah 1984) (preliminary hearing held 170 days 
af ter a r r e s t was proper, because there was no abuse of the rule 
allowing for extensions when good cause i s shown, and because a 
- 0 1 -
good port ion of the delay resul ted from defendant 's own ac t ions ) ; 
S ta te v. Kn i l l , 656 P.2d a t 1028 ( t r i a l court properly extended 
preliminary hearing beyond ten-day l imit for individual in 
custody where defendant had waived preliminary hearing, then 
l a t e r demanded the hear ing)• Moreover, t h i s Court has 
cons is ten t ly held tha t the decision to grant a continuance i s 
within the d i sc re t ion of the t r i a l court whose decision wi l l not 
be reversed absent an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S ta te v. Clark . 675 
P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1983); S ta te v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 
(Utah 1982); S ta te v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). 
The Sta te submits t ha t in te r locutory review of jud ic i a l 
decis ions i s the exact type of s i t ua t ion the Legis la ture had in 
mind when i t allowed for exceptions to the 30-day ru le . Because 
defendant has fa i led to show any abuse of d i sc re t ion by the court 
below, h i s argument tha t § 77-35-7(c) was v io la ted i s without 
mer i t . 
Further , by his ac t ions in proceedings below, defendant 
waived h i s r igh t to have a preliminary examination within 30 
days. At l e a s t one court has held t h a t , where the defendant did 
not object a t the time of the f i r s t continuance of his 
preliminary hearing, he waived the r igh t to object to the 
t imel iness of his preliminary hear ing. Bennett V. Stater 570 
P.2d 345, 347 (Okl. Cr. 1977). £ge 2±&SL In re Sandelr 64 Cal.2d 
412, 4121 P.2d 806, 808 n . l , 50 Cal. Rptr . 462 (1966) (defendant 
waived objection to f a i l u r e to bring him before magistrate within 
time allowed where he did not f i l e a timely motion to se t aside 
the information) . More importantly, because defendant 
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affirmatively delayed the proceedings in order to pursue his 
appeal, this Court has compelling reason to hold that defendant 
waived his right under § 77-35-7(c). ££. State v. Olriksen. 210 
Kan. 795, 504 P.2d 232, 236-37 (1972) (where defendant agreed to 
setting a preliminary hearing date beyond the ten-day statutory 
limit, and the State subsequently obtained a stay for good cause 
shown, defendant could not complain that he was not afforded his 
statutory preliminary hearing rights). It would indeed be 
anomalous if defendant, after deliberately delaying his 
determination of probable cause for nearly three years, were 
allowed to claim that his right to a preliminary hearing within 
30 days had been violated. 
Defendant claims that, even if the court below had good 
cause for granting the continuances, there are things the court 
should have done differently. He contends that the charges 
against him should have been dismissed while the discovery issue 
was litigated. He also urges that, where a continuance is 
granted, it should be for a specified time period. Because 
defendant cites no authority, statutory or otherwise, in support 
of his theories, this Court need not address the merit of these 
claims. See State v. Ami cone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) 
("Since the defendant fails to support this argument by any legal 
analysis or authority, we decline to rule on it"); State v. 
JjansLS, 657 P.2d at 1267 (this Court assumes regularity in the 
proceedings below). 
In State v. Lairby. after rejecting the defendant's 
claim that he was denied a speedy trial, this Court stated: 
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• . . For the same reasons, defendants1 
argument that . . . [the] preliminary 
hearing was delayed unreasonably is 
without merit. The parties stipulated 
to the continuances, no objection was 
made below, and there is no showing of 
prejudice. 
699 P.2d at 1193. 
In the present case, because there is no showing that 
the continuances were not based upon good cause, because 
defendant acted in a manner that waived his right under § 77-35-
7(c), and for the same reasons that his speedy trial argument is 
without merit, this Court should reject defendant's argument that 
he was denied his right to a preliminary examination within the 
prescribed time period. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 5rh day of November, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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